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11 Introduction
The host of the IO literature in the area of competitive/cooperative R&D in-
vestment regarding process innovation (Reinganum (1981), d’Aspremont and
Jacquemin (1988) (referred below as A&J(88)), Suzumura (1992), and Petit,
and Tolwinski (1999)) assumes that R&D investment has an immediate eﬀect
on the ﬁrm’s production capacity and/or eﬃciency. This implies that the
R&D project is completed instantaneously. Obviously, such a setup ignores
an important property of R&D, which is that an R&D project requires time to
complete.
Dutta (1997) investigates the problem of optimal budget management of an
R&D project, which is carried out in several stages. The paper analyzes an
optimization problem of a single decision maker. Our goal is to analyze the
ﬁrms’ R&D investment strategies in a duopolistic setting. We depart from the
static competitive/cooperative R&D investment A&J(88) model.
In our model we combine the knowledge spillover idea of A&J(88) with an
optimal R&D resource allocation problem setting. (Scherer (1967), Pacheco-de-
Almedia and Zemsky (2003)). The Pacheco-de-Almedia and Zemsky’s (2003)
discrete-time model is timed in three stages: resolution of uncertainty of du-
ration T, capacity investment also of duration T, and a production period of
inﬁnite length. We assume that the ﬁrms operate in a deterministic environ-
ment and, therefore, our model has two stages: R&D investment in order to
develop a new production process where the ﬁrm has to determine the duration
of the R&D process (while producing with old technology) and a production
stage from the moment of R&D completion onwards. It can be assumed as well
that uncertainty about the volume and the cost of R&D has been resolved in
the previous stages of research, and the ﬁrm now considers its project duration
decisions in the ﬁnal stretch of the innovation process. Our analysis is carried
out in a continous-time setting in the spirit of Scherer (1967).
In the presented model there is a positive relation between the degree of
innovation and the amount of knowledge to be accumulated in order to achieve
such an innovation. Although there is evidence that major product innovations
do not necessarily require large amounts of resources and/or research eﬀort (see
Bercovitz et al. (1997)), it is almost deﬁnitely true for process innovations.
The Toyota’ successful introduction of its "lean" auto assembly process (Teece
(1996) and Van Biesebroek (2003)) required a substantial amount of resources
to redesign the whole production system and coordinate it with its numerous
suppliers. Our study shows that, for bigger innovations a marginal increase in
total R&D eﬀort necessary to complete the innovation requires more additional
time than in the case of a smaller innovation.
The ﬁrm’s problem of determining the optimal duration of an R&D project
resembles the ground breaking model of technology adoption timing of Fuden-
berg and Tirole (1985), which was extended by works of Dutta et al. (1995),
Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube (2001) and (2005), and Hoppe (2000). But un-
like in the setting of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), where a new technology is
available and becomes adopted against some cost, our model contains an R&D
2process with endogenous time to complete, while the new technology can only
become available after this process is completed. Intermediate innovations can
not, thus, be used productively for the ﬁrm.
Also, unlike in studies of technology adoption timing of Katz and Shapiro
(1987) and Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube (2001), where earlier adoption means
usage of a less advanced technology, in this model the degree of innovation
and R&D duration decisions are uncoupled. We ﬁnd that our assumption ﬁts
better for a cost reducing process innovation, because the company deciding to
modernize its production process almost always has a particular level of cost
reduction in mind. As an example, consider Intel’s computer chip production
process, where each cycle of technological improvement has a goal of cutting
the production cost of "putting" one transistor on the chip by one half (Marcyk
(2002)).
With the degree of innovation not being dependent on time, this study shows
that in the precommitment equilibrium the optimal R&D project duration of
the leader (the ﬁrm, which ﬁnishes its R&D ﬁrst) is the same as the optimal
duration of the innovator in a duopoly, where only one ﬁrm conducts R&D; and
the optimal R&D project duration of the follower (the ﬁrm, which ﬁnishes its
R&D second) is the same as the optimal duration of the catching up innovator,
facing the opponent who already possesses the new technology.
Furthermore, we investigate the competitive equilibria under conditions of
knowledge spillovers, which create incentives for the ﬁrm to ﬁnish its R&D later
than its competitor. Katz and Shapiro (1987) considered ﬁrms with diﬀerent
proﬁt incentives for innovation and derived the corresponding preemption and
waiting game equilibria under diﬀerent spillover mechanisms such as licensing
and imitation. We ﬁnd that under conditions of weak knowledge spillovers, a
preemption equilibrium is more likely to occur, while the attrition equilibrium
will prevail when the spillovers are strong.
Firms’ payoﬀs in the preemption equilibrium and in the "war of attrition" are
diﬀerent from the corresponding precommitment cases. In the precommitment
scenarios with exogenous roles the optimal duration of R&D is determined by
the trade-oﬀ between the extra proﬁt gain from innovation and the additional
R&D cost from ﬁnishing the project sooner. Firms do not consider strategic
eﬀects and the incentives for preemption or attrition.
In the preemption scenario the optimal project durations are set in a way
that the follower is not able to preempt the leader. In such a situation the leader
makes its decisions based on the follower’s incentives to preempt (if the follower
has such incentives). As a result, the winner (leader) has lower payoﬀs than
in the corresponding precommitment case. In the attrition scenario the winner
(follower) must neutralize the other ﬁrm’s second mover advantage and give up
part of its proﬁts. But, unlike in the preemption case, where the deviating
ﬁrm has the same payoﬀ as in the original position, in the war of attrition the
ﬁrm, which deviates, ends up with higher payoﬀs than in the original position.
The looser in the war of attrition receives some extra beneﬁts by getting a more
extended period of technological leadership. This happens due to the fact that
in our model adopting earlier does not mean that the leader will have a less
3advanced technology than the follower.
In the presented model we consider two asymmetric ﬁrms, which have dif-
ferent R&D eﬃciencies in the form of diﬀerent per unit marginal cost of R&D.
This asymmetry plays a role in determining who will become the leader and
the follower, when feedback equilibria are considered. With a reasonable small
asymmetry in R&D eﬃciency between ﬁrms, the game with endogenous roles
can have preemption or attrition equilibria depending on diﬀerent values of the
parameters. But if one ﬁrm has a strong advantage in R&D eﬃciency over
the other, a preemption or attrition game cannot occur. In such a situation
the more R&D eﬃcient ﬁrm is almost always capable of capturing the leading
position.
This paper is structured as follows; the second section of this study presents
the model of competitive R&D with time to build and knowledge spillovers. Sec-
t i o n s3 ,4 ,5a n d6p r e s e n ts o l u t i o n so ft h em o d e lf o rm o n o p o l y ,o n e - i n n o v a t o r
duopoly, catching-up innovator duopoly, and the two-innovators duopoly, re-
spectively. Conclusions and discussions are presented in Section 7.
2 The Model of R&D with Time to Build
In this section we present the setting and main assumptions for the model of a
competitive R&D in duopoly with time to build and knowledge spillovers.
Let us consider the following scenario. A ﬁrm is producing a good with a
particular technology. This production technology can be improved through
process innovation, which results in decreasing the marginal cost of production.
In the initial state of development, this technology allows the ﬁrm to produce
with marginal cost A. The ﬁrm has all necessary R&D capabilities to imple-
ment the required innovation, which will allow it to bring the marginal cost of
production down to zero.
The ﬁrm knows exactly how much R&D is needed to reach a given level of
production eﬃciency. By engaging in R&D the ﬁrm must realize a knowledge
gain in order to obtain the new production technology. It takes time to complete
each R&D project. The marginal cost decrease takes place only after the project
is completed (i.e. the knowledge gain is fully realized). There is another
competing ﬁrm in the market operating under the same set of rules, which
makes it a duopoly.
Consider an A&J(88)-type problem, where the A&J(88) framework is ex-
tended by taking the above conditions into account. Assume that for ﬁrm i
completion of an R&D project results in decreasing the marginal production
cost from A to 0.
We assume that the two ﬁrms are symmetric in their marginal costs of pro-
duction (A1 = A2 = A). Therefore, following the speciﬁcation of the A&J(88)
model, ﬁrm i’s total individual knowledge gain must equal ﬁrm i’s marginal
cost of production before innovation, A. In this way we explicitly establish a
positive correlation between the degree of process innovation and the knowledge
gain necessary to achieve such an innovation.
4To model the "time to complete", we assume that the ﬁrm subdivides the




xi(t)dt = A, i =1 ,2,
where xi(t) is the knowledge gain of ﬁrm i,a n dn is the total duration of the
R&D project.
The ﬁrms are assumed to be asymmetric in R&D eﬀectiveness, represented
by diﬀerent R&D eﬃciency (γ1 ￿= γ2). The corresponding present value of











where r is the discount rate.
Currently we assume that the outcome of each step of the R&D project is
deterministic. By spending Ξi dollars ﬁrm i achieves the projected decrease of
the marginal production cost of A. After the R&D process is completed, the
ﬁrm will continue producing with an upgraded technology from time n onwards.
There are knowledge spillovers present in the market, but unlike in A&J(88),
where a part of one ﬁrm’s R&D eﬀort is utilized by the other ﬁrm immediately
in the form of extra production cost beneﬁt, in our case only one ﬁrm can beneﬁt
from a knowledge spillover, which is the ﬁrm that completes its R&D later than
the other. Here we make a reasonable assumption that during the project
implementation stage the ﬁrms are capable of protecting their knowledge so
that no information ﬂows occur. Yet, when one ﬁrm completes the project and
the R&D output becomes realized (Grossman and Helpman (1990)), the other
ﬁrm will be able to obtain some extra technological knowledge by observing the
new technology or products produced with it.
We assume that this amount of knowledge equals a part of the other ﬁrm’s
t o t a lk n o w l e d g eg a i n . F o re x a m p l e ,i fﬁ r mi ﬁnishes its R&D as second, it will
receive a knowledge spillover of βA at the moment when ﬁrm j completes its
project, where parameter β (0 <β<1) here determines the strength or degree
of such a knowledge spillover.
Here we address the problem of determining the optimal project duration
time, given a certain amount of new knowledge needed to complete the project to
be carried out during this time. Currently, we approach this task by considering
a two-stageR&D/production game where theﬁrm must carry out oneinnovation
cycle to achieve one technological breakthrough.
Two situations can be distinguished: one situation with exogenous ﬁrm roles
that are prescribed beforehand implicitely which ﬁrm will become the leader and
ﬁnish the R&D process ﬁrst (precommitment strategies as deﬁned in Reinganum
(1981)) In the second situation it is not established beforehand which of the two
ﬁrms will ﬁnish its R&D ﬁrst. In the latter case the ﬁrm roles are endogenous.
5First, we derive the solution of the general problem of R&D with time to
build. Then we consider an open-loop gamesetting with exogenous rolesin cases
of one-innovator duopoly, catching-up innovator duopoly, and the two innovators
duopoly, respectively. The monopoly case is considered as a benchmark. The
feedback model with endogenous roles is presented later.
3 Solution of General Problem of R&D with
Time to Build
Let us consider a ﬁrm which produces with some technology generating the proﬁt
stream π0(q(t)). If this ﬁrm invests in R&D it can obtain a new technology,
which will generate the proﬁt stream π1(q(t)) after the innovation is completed.
Innovation requires time to build as set in the above model description.

















First we maximize this payoﬀ function with respect to q(t) and x(t) for a
































Maximizing (2) with respect to x(t) and given the optimal π∗
0 and π∗
1 is
equivalent to minimizing the total cost of R&D carrying out the project subject














6The set of ﬁrst order conditions is:
∂H
∂x






x(t)dt −A =0 . (6)
From (5) we get x(t)=λnert








The time schedule of the R&D eﬀort presented in (7) implies the R&D eﬀort
increases during the project implementation phase. This result is in line with
the ﬁnding of Grossman and Shapiro (1986) stating that, due to discounting,
R&D expenditures increase.















where ∆π = π1 − π0 is the ﬁrm’s proﬁt gain from innovation.
The FOCs for solving (8) is:
e−rn[γA2r2 − 2∆π(1 − e−rn)2]=0 . (9)
Equation (9) has two nonzero roots in terms of e−rn. But, we are interested
only in non-negative values of n, which means that we consider only values

























Here we present a one-ﬁrm benchmark case. Consider the ﬁrm weighing a
decision about the length of the R&D project n, which will result in achieving
a marginal production cost decrease of A. After the project is completed, the












Figure 1: Monopolist’s project duration as a function of the degree of innova-
tion/knowledge gain (r = 0.05, γ =1 0 ).
ﬁrm will be able to produce with a lower marginal production cost from time n
onwards. The inverse market demand function is speciﬁed as
p =1− q.





































8As we see in Figure 1, the optimal duration of R&D exhibits an S-shaped
relationship with respect to the degree of innovation/knowledge gain A.I t
has a concave shape for smaller values of A and becomes convex as A gets
larger. To ﬁnd the explanation of this fact we consider the eﬀects of knowledge
gain and degree of innovation apart from each other. We do this by allowing













As we can see, the optimal duration of the R&D project is positively de-
pendent on the amount of knowledge gain needed for innovation and negatively
dependent on the square root of proﬁt gain from this innovation. Thus, the de-
gree of convexity(concavity) of the optimal duration with respect to the degree
of innovation is determined by the relative size of the knowledge gain and the
proﬁt gain of innovation.
The proﬁt gain from innovation creates an incentive to speed up the R&D
processin order to start beneﬁting from the new technology sooner, thus pressing
n∗ down. As the R&D cost is convex in the knowledge gain, the value of
additional knowledge gain necessary to complete R&D translates directly into
additional research costs, which creates an incentive to extend the R&D process
in order to decrease the present value of total R&D costs. The trade oﬀ between
these two factors determines the optimal duration of the R&D project, which
is also the case in the models of technology adoption timing (Fudenberg and
Tirole (1985) and others).
Due to positive correlation between the degree of innovation and the nec-
essary knowledge gain, the increase in parameter A l e a d st oi n c r e a s ei nb o t h
knowledge and proﬁt gains of the ﬁrm. As A gets larger the downward pressure
of the additional proﬁt gain on the optimal R&D duration (incentive to speed
up R&D) becomes weaker while the upward pressure of the necessary knowledge
gain on n (incentive to extend the R&D project) becomes stronger. Thus, for
more substantial innovations each additional knowledge gain for the monopolist
requires more additional time than in the case of smaller innovation.
5 One Innovator Duopoly
In this section we present the case of one-innovator duopoly, where only one
ﬁrm carries out R&D, while the other stays with the same technology. The role
of innovator is assigned to ﬁrm 1 (denoted by 1 in the superscript along with a
star). The non-innovating ﬁrm 2 maximizes with respect to output the proﬁt
function, which depends on ﬁrm i’s R&D duration decision.
The inverse market demand function in a duopoly is given by:
p = 1 − (q1 + q2)











































































































The relationship between the optimal duration of the R&D of one innovator
and the degree of innovation/knowledge gain is presented in Figure 2. Here the
shape of the relationship between knowledge gain/degree of innovation and the
optimal duration of the project for the same parameter values is similar to that
of the monopolist (Figure 1), but has a less prominent S-shape. Indeed, for
relatively large innovations (with A > 2
9) the innovator’s proﬁt gain is higher
than the proﬁt gain of the monopolist, resulting in stronger incentives to keep
the project duration short. If the degree of innovation is small (A ≤ 2
9), the
eﬀect of the proﬁt gain is stronger for the monopolist.
6 "Catching Up" Innovator Duopoly
Here we consider the case where one ﬁrm is already in possession of the new
technology and the other ﬁrm decides about developing the new technology











Figure 2: An innovator’s project duration as a function of the degree of inno-
vation/knowledge gain (δ = 0.05, γ1 =1 0 )
in the "catch up" mode. Let us assume that ﬁrm 1 produces with the new
technology and ﬁrm 2 must develop one to be able to compete as equal. Firm




x2(t)dt =( 1− β)A.
The corresponding payoﬀs of the catching up innovator are (the order of indexes














































































































The relationship between the degree of innovation/knowledge gain and the
o p t i m a ld u r a t i o no fR & Di sp r e s e n t e di nF i g u r e3 . H e r ew em u s tt a k ei n t o
account that there is another parameter, which plays a role in determining the
shape of the optimal project duration for the catching-up innovator. This
parameter is the strength of knowledge spillovers. The stronger the knowledge
spillover the smaller the amount of additional knowledge gain is needed, and,
thus, the less additional time should be spent on R&D. In Figure 4 it is clearly
visible that as knowledge spillovers get stronger, the relationship between the
degree of innovation/knowledge gain becomes more concave.
In Figure 3 we observe that the optimal duration curve with respect to the
knowledge gain and the degree of innovation in case of the catching-up innovator
is S-shaped with a prominent convex interval. This is explained by the fact that




is always smaller than the innovator’s proﬁt gain in the one innovator duopoly
(∆π∗1
1 = 4A
9 ). Thus, the catching-up innovator has less incentives to conduct
its R&D fast.












Figure 3: "Catching-up" innovator’s project duration as a function of the degree
of innovation/knowledge gain (r = 0.05, γ2 =1 0 , β =0 .2)















Figure 4: Optimal project duration of the catching-up innovator as a function
of A and β (r =0 .05, γ2 =1 0 ).
137 Two Innovators with Diﬀerent Project Dura-
tions
After studying the scenarios where only one ﬁrm must make the optimal R&D
duration decision, we turn our attention to the case where both ﬁrms in duopoly
innovate and set the optimal time to build for the new technology.
First of all, we want to determine the conditions under which two ﬁrms will
choose diﬀerent durations of their R&D, creating in this way the situation where
one ﬁrm becomes the ﬁrst investor, or the leader, and the other becomes the
second inventor, or the follower. The follower then beneﬁts from the knowledge
spillovers generated by the leader.
Let us for now assume that ﬁrm 2 is going to spend more time developing
its new technology: n2 >n 1. Currently we consider γ1 ￿= γ2, but we do not
make any assumptions about which of these parameters is greater.
As ﬁrm 2’s project duration is longer than that of ﬁrm 1 we take into account
two main changes in the ﬁrms’ proﬁt functions. First, ﬁrm 2 will beneﬁt from
the knowledge spillovers generated at the moment after ﬁrm 1 completes its
R&D project. Second, during the time period between n1 and n2 ﬁrm 1 will
enjoy a technological advantage over ﬁrm 2.

































































































































































































As the problem is constructed based on the assumption that n2 >n 1,t h i s
result only holds under the parameters requirements, which ensure that nF
2 >
nL
1 .G i v e n δ<1, it is clear that nF
2 >n L









(1 −β)2.( 1 6 )
Interpreted directly, expression (16) presents the condition ensuring that the
follower ﬁrm will still have to devote more time to complete its R&D than the
leader even with the beneﬁt of knowledge spillovers. Such a situation is most
likely to occur if a notable asymmetry between ﬁrms is accompanied by weak
knowledge spillovers and a modest degree of innovation.
If (16) does not hold, knowledge spillovers allow the follower to ﬁnish its
R&D as soon as the leader completes the project and the knowledge spillovers
get realized. In such a case the follower beneﬁts from knowledge created by the
leader and does not have a stream of lower proﬁts associated with the period
when it lags behind in developing the new technology. Such an outcome occurs
in case of a smaller asymmetry, strong knowledge spillovers and a small degree
of innovation, which ensure that the second-mover advantage (Hoppe (2000))
will be the strongest. Nonetheless, if the roles are exogenously predeﬁned,
the leader’s optimal R&D duration choice is not aﬀected by the fact that the
follower will immediately bring up the new technology after the leader.









(1−β)2 = ∞, we conclude that under condi-
tions of strong knowledge spillovers the follower will ﬁnish the R&D project at









(1−β)2 =0 , we see that with weak knowledge
spillovers the feasible leader-follower arrangement is likely to hold for a broad
range of asymmetries between ﬁrms. Moreover, in case of a large degree of
innovation the leader must not be necessarily more eﬃcient in R&D than the
follower, due to a very strong incentive to preempt.
Above we have considered the condition for existence of a unique solution of
the problem where the leader’s role is assigned to ﬁrm 1. If the leader’s role is






In a situation where both (16) and (17) hold both ﬁrms will be able to
perform the corresponding functions of the leader/follower, and the equilibrium
will be the result of the game with endogenous roles.
Remark 1 We observe that the leader’s optimal R&D project duration is the
same as the optimal duration of the innovator in the one innovator duopoly:
nL
1 = n∗1
1 ; and the follower’s optimal R&D project duration is the same as the
optimal duration of the catching up innovator: nF
2 = n∗1
2 .
Observing results presented in Remark 1 and analyzing ﬁrms’ payoﬀ func-
tions (14) and (15) we make the following observations. The leader’s optimal
R&D project duration based on the proﬁt gain from innovation determined by
the diﬀerence in proﬁts in times t ∈ (0,n 1] (duopoly with old technology) and
times t ∈ (n1,n 2), where the leader has a technological advantage. Therefore,
the decisive factor for the leader is the fact of technological leadership during a
certain period of time. The proﬁt stream generated in time periods after both
ﬁrms acquire the new technology is not relevant for the leader’s R&D duration
decisions.
On the other hand, the follower’s optimal R&D duration is based on the
proﬁt gain determined by the diﬀerence in proﬁts in times t ∈ (n1,n 2] and
t ∈ (n2,∞) (duopoly with new technology). Thus, the follower disregards the
proﬁts during the time period when both ﬁrms have the old technology and
t a k e si n t oa c c o u n tt h ef a c tt h a ti tw i l lb ei nt h ei n f e r i o rp o s i t i o nf o rs o m et i m e ,
but will beneﬁt from knowledge spillovers.
In other words, the technological leader will behave (regarding the duration
of R&D) as if it is the only innovator in the market with the old technology.
On the other hand, the follower will behave as the (catching-up) innovator in
a duopoly market where the leader produces with a superior technology. This






















Figure 5: R&D Investment and Timing Decisions Tree.
under conditions of strong imitation risk, the timing of technology adoption
by the leader is not inﬂuenced by imitation as long as its leader position is
preserved.
In Appendix we also present the benchmark case of the two innovators
duopoly with the same project duration, which results will be used in later
discussions.
8 Strategy Choice in the Endogenous Roles Game
Here we analyze the ﬁrms’ optimal decisions regarding carrying out the R&D
and the mode in which this research must proceed (leader or follower). In
the leader mode the ﬁrm will complete its R&D ﬁrst, without beneﬁtting from
any positive knowledge spillovers. In the follower mode the ﬁrm will complete
its innovation as second and will receive an additional beneﬁt in the form of
knowledge spillovers generated by the leader.
Wederivethe ﬁrms’ payoﬀ for each feasibleoutcome ofdiﬀerent leader/follower
decisions in Figure 5, and formulate the ﬁrms’ optimal strategies. For simplic-
ity purposes we assume that A < 1
2, so that duopoly is preserved in case one
ﬁrm does not invest in R&D.
It can be shown (see Appendix A??) that ﬁrms will ﬁnish their R&D projects
simultaneously if and only if they have the same R&D eﬃciencies. Therefore,
for asymmetric ﬁrms with γ1 ￿= γ2 the game will not have the outcome with the
simultaneous completion of R&D.
In this game we ﬁrst consider only the decision paths where each ﬁrm chooses
17the leader/follower role compatible with its competitor’s role, such as on the
paths leading to the outcomes (2), (3), (4), (6), (7), and (8) in Figure 5. On
the paths corresponding to the outcomes (1) and (5) both ﬁrms choose to be
the leader or the follower, respectively. In these cases, one of them must switch
its role for the equilibrium to exist. Outcome (1) is a preemption game and
in the situation corresponding to outcome (5) a waiting game (war of attrition)
takes place.
In this section we derive the ﬁrms’ payoﬀs corresponding to the compatible
role decisions ﬁrst, followed by a description of the preemption game and the
waiting game in the outcomes with incompatible role choices.
8.1 Compatible Role Decisions
The compatible role decisions of ﬁrms produce the equilibria derived in the same
way as in the scenarios with exogenous roles shown in Sections 5 to 7.
In the outcome (2) the roles of two ﬁrms are clearly deﬁned. Firm 1 is the


























































































































































In the outcome (4) the roles are a reverse of the outcome (2) with ﬁrm 1





























































































































































19In the outcome (8) both ﬁrms decide not to invest in R&D resulting in the
standard Cournot equilibrium with:




















8.2 Preemption Game for Leadership
The decision path leading to the outcome (1) in the game corresponds to the
scenario where both ﬁrms decide to invest in R&D and want to be the ﬁrst to

























If γ1 <γ 2,t h e nnL
1 <n L
2 . Nonetheless ﬁrm 2 may attempt to preempt ﬁrm
1 by ﬁnishing its project a bit earlier as long as the proﬁts obtained in the
leader position are higher than the proﬁts of the follower or abandoning the
R&D. Firm 1 will follow the same logic and will deﬁnitely react to ﬁrm 2’s
preemption attempts. Such a preemption game is illustrated in Figure 6.
As it was mentioned in Remark 1 above, the leader’s project duration in the
two-innovator duopoly is the same as the duration in the case of one innovator
(nL
i = n∗i
i ). The after-innovation proﬁts stream of the only innovator is higher
(π∗i
i >π L
i ), because the innovating ﬁrm has a technology advantage. Thus,
a deviation of one ﬁrm from the R&D leadership decision (decision to become
a follower or abandon R&D) will not change the other ﬁrm’s decision about
investing in R&D (it will always innovate).
Let us consider some particular value of the R&D project duration ¯ n such
that ¯ n<n L
1 and ¯ n ≤ nL
2 .T h u s , ¯ n represents the project duration decision by
which one of the ﬁrms tries to preempt the other. Each ﬁrm can decrease the
value of ¯ n until the proﬁts from preempting become lower than the proﬁts from
b e c o m i n gaf o l l o w e ro rg i v i n gu pt h eR & D .














































































Figure 6: Preeemption Game Diagram (A = 0.49, γ1 =9 5 , γ2 =1 0 0 , β =0 .01,
r =5 % ).
The equations in (18) represent the conditions where ﬁrm 1 will deviate from
its leader’s decision and will decide to become the follower or not to invest in
the new technology at all. The equations in (19) represent the same conditions
for ﬁrm 2.
To derive which of the two ﬁrms will be able to preempt its competitor we
need to explicitly calculate the critical values of duration where the ﬁrm will





































Deriving these critical values algebraically results in very complex and non-
tractable expressions. Thus, in this study we will use numerical simulations to
illustrate some scenarios.



















, if ¯ n1 < ¯ n2, (22)



















, if ¯ n2 < ¯ n1, (23)
21i.e. when ﬁrm 1 deviates ﬁrst.
The ﬁrst set of the preemption payoﬀs corresponds to the case where ﬁrm 2
will give up its leader role ﬁrst (the case shown in Figure 6) and the second set
corresponds to the case of ﬁrm 1 abandoning its leadership. These outcomes are
diﬀerent from those obtained in the situations with exogenously deﬁned roles.
In the precommitment scenarios with exogenous roles the optimal duration
of R&D is determined by the trade-oﬀ between the extra proﬁt gain from inno-
vation and the additional R&D cost from ﬁnishing the project sooner. Firms
do not consider strategic eﬀects and the incentives for preemption.
In the endogenous roles scenario the optimal project durations are set in a
way that the follower is not able to preempt the leader. In such a situation
the leader makes its decisions based on the followers incentives to preempt (if
the follower has such incentives). By speeding up its R&D the leader gives up
a part of its proﬁts to cancel out the preemption incentives of the competitor.
As a result of the preemption game, the winner ends up with lower payoﬀs than
in the corresponding precommitment case.
Figure 6 illustrates the situation where ﬁrm 1 will become eﬀectively the
leader and sets its R&D duration to ¯ n2 ( g o i n gf o ra ne v e ns h o r t e rR & Dp r o j e c t
will further decrease ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts). Firm 2 will accept the follower’s role and
sets its R&D duration so that it maximizes its proﬁts given the leader’s duration
¯ n2. Correspondingly, in the situation leading to the second set of payoﬀs ﬁrm
2 will become the leader with duration ¯ n1.
Unlike in the exogenous roles scenarios, the leader’s R&D duration decision
directly depends on the follower’s decision determined by conditions (20) and
(21), respectively.








where ¯ n is determined by conditions in (18) and (19).
8.3 War of Attrition to Become the Follower
The second game’s outcome with endogenous roles is the outcome (5) where
both ﬁrms prefer to become the follower. In such a situation the ﬁrm wants to
beneﬁt from knowledge spillovers, thus trying to be the second to complete the

























Firm 2 with a larger total R&D eﬀort (γ2 >γ 1)h a snF
2 >n F
1 .Y e t ﬁ r m 1 may
have some room for trying to "outwait" ﬁrm 2 in order to capture the follower























Figure 7: Attrition Game Diagram (r = 5%, A =0 .2, γ1 = 150, γ2 =2 5 0 ,
β =0 .8).
position or make it abandon its R&D completely. In case the attrition game
takes place, we conduct comparisons of ﬁrms’ proﬁts in diﬀerent situations to
ﬁgure out the outcomes.








2 . Duration choice n
¯
represents
the decision where one ﬁrm tries to extend the time to complete its R&D so
that it will become the follower. As in the preemption game, the other ﬁrm
may extend its project’s duration as well in order to outwait its opponent (as
s h o w ni nF i g u r e7 ) .
It can be easily seen from (14) that the leader’s payoﬀ is an increasing and
concave function in terms of the follower’s optimal R&D project duration. Thus,
the conditions where the ﬁrm 1 will give up the follower role in the attrition





















































Similarly to the previous case, here diﬀerent conditions determine diﬀerent
scenarios and, thus, diﬀerent solutions of the game. But, unlike in the preemp-
tion scenario, deviation of one ﬁrm from its decision to invest in R&D as the
follower can lead to a change in the other ﬁrm’s decision as well. This happens
23when one ﬁrm decides to abandon it R&D completely. In this case it becomes
impossible for the other ﬁrm to be the follower, so it must invest in R&D is the
only innovator or abandon its research too.





































2 (as illustrated in Figure
7). Here ﬁrm 1 will be the ﬁrst to deviate from the follower role. If πL
1 ≥ π∗2
1 ,
then ﬁrm 1 will accept the leader role, with ﬁrm 2 as the follower and with ﬁrm
1 setting its R&D duration equal to n
¯
1. On the other hand, observing π∗2
1 >π L
1
ﬁrm 1 will abandon its R&D. This will make ﬁrm 2 to reconsider its own R&D
decision. As becoming the follower is no longer feasible, there are two other
options left: ﬁrm 2 may pursue the innovation alone (if π∗2
2 ≥ π2), or abandon
its R&D as well (π∗2
2 <π 2). The similar logical sequence is used to determine







































































































Like in the preemption scenario we will use simpliﬁed notations for the ﬁrms’












Firms’ payoﬀs in the war of attrition are also diﬀerent from the corresponding
precommitment cases. The winner (follower) has to cancel out the other ﬁrm’s
incentives to extent its R&D (second mover advantage), thus it has to give up
part of its proﬁts. But, unlike in the preemption case, where the deviating ﬁrm
has the same payoﬀ as in the original position, in the war of attrition the ﬁrm,
which deviates, ends up with the higher payoﬀs than in the original position.
The looser (in this case the leader) receives some extra beneﬁts in the form of a
24Table 1: Process Innovation Game
Firm 2





























Table 2: Payoﬀ matrix for the game with preemption equilibrium
Firm 2

















more extended period of the technological advantage. This happens due to the
fact that, unlike in the technology adoption literature mentioned in this study,
in our model adopting earlier does not mean that the leader will have a less
advanced technology than the follower.
8.4 Payoﬀ Matrix
Thus, the game depicted in Figure 5 has seven feasible outcomes: (1), (2), (3),
(4), (5), (7), (8). The corresponding game in the strategic form is presented in
Table 1.
From the discussion above we see that, depending on values of the model
parameters there can be diﬀerent (unique and not unique) equilibria, and, thus,
corresponding optimal strategies. Below we present some numerical examples
identifying some interesting cases.
8.5 Example 1: Preemption Equilibrium
Let us consider the ﬁrst possible scenario for the game with the following set
of parameters: A =0 .49, γ1 =9 5 , γ2 = 100, β =0 .01,r=5 % ,w h i c hi s
also the same set used for the illustration in Figure 6. Here two ﬁrms face
an innovation with a small diﬀerence in their R&D eﬃciencies and very weak
knowledge spillovers. The calculated payoﬀs matrix is presented in Table 2.
The game produces two equilibria, both of which imply that ﬁrm 1 will
become the leader and ﬁrm 2 will become the follower. One of this equilibria
25Table 3: Payoﬀ matrix for the game with attrition equilibrium
Firm 2




















is equivalent to the precommitment situation and another is produced by a
preemption game. In both equilibria the payoﬀ of the follower is the same and
the leader has a smaller payoﬀ in the preemption equilibrium.
If the roles of the ﬁrms are determined endogenously, this particular pa-
rameter setting will produce one Nash equilibrium, which is the preemption
equilibrium. In order to preempt its opponent ﬁrm 1 will have to speed up
development resulting in a leader’s payoﬀ decrease of 18%.
8.6 Example 2: Attrition Equilibrium
The next parameters set is: r = 5%, A =0 .2, γ1 =1 5 0 , γ2 = 250, β =0 .8,
which corresponds to the illustration in Figure 7. In this scenario we see two
ﬁrms with notable diﬀerence in the R&D production eﬃciency, which consider
investing in a relatively small innovation under conditions of strong knowledge
spillovers. Numerical calculations give us the payoﬀs matrix as presented in
Table 3.
This game has a unique Nash equilibrium, corresponding to the outcome of a
war of attrition. As a result of the waiting game the follower’s payoﬀ decreased
by 25% and the leader’s payoﬀ increased by 26%. In case of precommitment
strategies, the game would have two leader/follower equilibria and ﬁrms would
face a coordination problem.
8.7 Example 3: No Preemption/Attrition Scenario
To ﬁnd out the eﬀect of larger asymmetry between ﬁrms we consider the fol-
lowing parameter set: A = 0.49, γ1 =5 0 , γ2 =1 0 0 , β =0 .01,r=5 % ,w h i c hi s
diﬀerent from that in Example 1 only by a larger degree of asymmetry between
ﬁrms. From Figures 8 and 9 we can clearly see that neither preemption nor
war of attrition are possible.
A very large advantage of a more R&D eﬃcient ﬁrm eliminates any pre-
emption incentives for the less R&D eﬃcient ﬁrm. On the other hand, the
knowledge spillover is not strong enough to create the incentive to engage in a
waiting game. Thus, it is obvious, that the only outcomes feasible in this game



















Figure 8: No preemption scenario (A = 0.49, γ1 =5 0 , γ2 = 100, β =0 .01,
r =5 % )
are those with compatible strategies, which provide the payoﬀs equivalent to
the payoﬀs in equilibria with endogenous roles.
9 Conclusions
This study highlights the aspects distinguishing the model of competitive R&D
with time to build from the model of technology adoption. First of all the
model presented here emphasizes such property of R&D as a positive correlation
between the degree of innovation and the amount of knowledge gain necessary
to achieve the breakthrough. Our study show that for more substantial process
innovations a marginal increase in total R&D eﬀort necessary to complete the
innovation requires more additional time than in the case of a smaller innovation.
When analyzing ﬁrms’ competitive strategies we distinguish two types of
equilibria: one type with exogenous ﬁrm roles prescribing beforehand which
ﬁrm will become the leader and ﬁnish the R&D process ﬁrst The second type
implies that it is not established beforehand which of two ﬁrms will ﬁnish its
R&D ﬁrst. In the latter case the ﬁrm roles are endogenous.
It is observed that in the exogenously deﬁned leader/follower duopoly the
optimal R&D project duration of the leader is the same as the optimal duration
of the innovator in the duopoly, where only one ﬁrm does R&D; and the optimal
R&D project duration of the follower is the same as the optimal duration of
the catching up innovator, facing the opponent who already possesses the new
technology. While making the R&D duration decisions the leader disregards
the proﬁts after both ﬁrms acquire the new technology, concentrating solely
on the fact of technological leadership. The follower, in its turn, disregards


















Figure 9: No attrition scenario (A =0 .49, γ1 =5 0 , γ2 = 100, β =0 .01,r=5 % )
the proﬁts where both ﬁrms have the old technology and takes into account its
technological handicap resulting from slower innovation. This emphasizes the
importance of strategic eﬀects for the ﬁrms’ R&D duration decisions.
We ﬁnd that with weak knowledge spillovers the feasible leader-follower
arrangement is likely to hold for a broad range of asymmetries between ﬁrms.
Moreover, in case of a large degree of innovation the leader must not be neces-
sarily more eﬃcient in R&D than the follower, due to a very strong incentive to
preempt.
With a reasonably small asymmetry in R&D eﬃciency between ﬁrms, the
game with endogenous roles can have preemption or attrition equilibria depend-
ing on the parameter constellations. But if one ﬁrm has strong advantage in
R&D eﬃciency over another, preemption game and/or attrition games become
not feasible, thus the more R&D eﬃcient ﬁrm is capable of securing its techno-
logical leadership.
2810 APPENDIX
10.1 Two Innovators, Same Project Duration Duopoly Case
Consider ﬁrms’ competitive R&D and production strategies provided that to
complete the project they have diﬀerent R&D eﬃciencies, but must carry out
their R&D during the same period of time. In this case none of the ﬁrms is
able to make use of knowledge spillovers occurring after completion of R&D.
We, thus, assume that ﬁrms have γ1 ￿= γ2,a n dn1 = n2 = n.






























































for i,j = 1,2, i ￿= j.
It is clearly visible that if γi ￿= γj, the model does not provide an equilibrium
solution with n∗
i = n∗
j. Therefore we conclude that it is not optimal for the two
ﬁrms with diﬀerent R&D eﬃciency to choose the same R&D project durations.
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